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Abstract
We investigate the impact of exogenous income shocks on health using twenty years
of data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamic. To unravel the impact of income on
health from unobserved heterogeneity and reverse causality, we employ techniques from
the literature on the estimation of dynamic panel data models. Contrary to much of the
previous literature on the gradient, we ﬁnd that, on average, adverse income shocks lead
to a deterioration of health. These eﬀects are most pronounced for working-aged men and
are dominated by transitions into the very bottom of the earnings distribution. We also
provide suggestive evidence of an association between negative income shocks and higher
mortality for working-aged men.
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1 Introduction
The relationship between economic circumstances and health or the gradient has been the subject
of academic inquiry for quite some time. While these inquiries have documented a strong positive
correlation between socioeconomic status (SES) and health in a variety of contexts, they have
failed to produce a consensus among scholars concerning the underlying causal pathways. Indeed,
ﬁerce debate has characterized the discussions among social scientists concerning the possible
directions of causality with the dividing lines often being drawn between disciplines. Typically,
on one side of the divide are the economists, who tend to champion the causal pathway from
health to income (Smith 1999, Adams, Hurd, et al. 2002). On the other side of the divide are
the public health experts and epidemiologists who tend to be advocates of the reverse causal
pathway from SES to health (Marmot, et al. 1991, Marmot 2004). In this paper, we attempt
to shed a new light on this debate by tackling the question of what happens to a person’s health
when they experience a shock to their income.
There are many possible pathways through which shocks to earnings or employment can
impact health. The ﬁrst and, perhaps most obvious, is that they might be accompanied by
higher stress levels due to increased diﬃculty paying bills or providing for one’s family. Within
the context of a model of health investment al aGrossman (1972), this would be modeled by
income directly entering the health production function. However, contrary to conventional
2wisdom, not all of these pathways suggest that an earnings shock should lead to a deterioration
of health. For example, adverse shocks to employment might actually improve health since this
would tend to relax time constraints and tighten budget constraints which would provide more
leisure time that could be used to exercise and decrease the consumption of unhealthy vices
(provided that they are normal goods). Indeed, Ruhm (2000) and (2005) provides evidence
for this “healthy living” mechanism. In addition, while being unemployed might induce stress,
working long hours and constantly being subject to the exigencies of the modern workplace is
also a potential source of stress and stress-induced illnesses such as hypertension. Accordingly,
the direction of the impact of an income shock on health is not ap r i o r iobvious and will largely
depend on the relative magnitudes of these diﬀerent eﬀects. The question of which eﬀects
dominate is an empirical matter.
To elucidate the answer to this question, we use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynam-
i c s( P S I D )w h i c ho ﬀers a wealth of information which can be exploited to investigate this issue.
To measure economic circumstance, we use data on labor income and county-level unemployment
rates. Our health data are provided by measures of self-reported health status (SRHS) and the
PSID’s death ﬁle which provides a record of the deaths of all PSID respondents through 2003.
One primary advantage of the PSID is that its longitudinal structure allows us to use a rich
literature on the estimation of dynamic panel data models. The estimation technique that we
employ comes from Arellano and Bond (1991). It exploits moment conditions which allow health
to impact labor supply in contemporaneous and future time periods. If valid, these conditions
enable us to identify the causal impact of income shocks on health. One of the advantages of
the PSID is that its length guarantees a large number of moment conditions which allow us to
3carry out speciﬁcation tests that shed light on the validity of these restrictions. In addition, the
procedure allows for individual-speciﬁc ﬁxed-eﬀects which can be arbitrarily correlated with the
right-hand-side covariates which mitigates many concerns of omitted variables bias. While this
and similar techniques have commonly been employed in labor economics (see Carrasco 2001,
Hyslop 1999, Meghir and Pistaferri 2004, for just a few examples), these techniques are utilized
with far less frequency in health economics. This is one of this papers primary contributions to
the literature on health and income.
Using the Arellano-Bond estimator, we provide substantial evidence that, on average,a n
adverse income shock leads to a deterioration in health. These eﬀects are largest for working-
a g e dm e n ,b u tw ea l s oﬁnd some weaker eﬀects for working-aged women. For men, our estimated
coeﬃcient on income is large and is often equal and opposite the coeﬃcient on age. These eﬀects
tend to be concentrated in the bottom part of the income distribution and appear to be dominated
by transitions into a prolonged period of unemployment. In addition, despite ﬁnding that adverse
income shocks lead to worse health outcomes on average, we also provide some evidence that
movements from either the lower or the upper tail of the income distribution towards the middle of
the distribution are associated with improvements in health. Finally, using the PSID’s mortality
ﬁle, we provide suggestive evidence of an association between negative income shocks and higher
mortality for working-aged men.
The balance of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data. In Section
3, we present our identiﬁcation strategy and core results. In Section 4, we provide evidence on
the relationship between income risk and mortality. Section 5 concludes.
42D a t a
T h ed a t at h a tw ee m p l o yc o m ef r o mt h eP S I D . O u rs a m p l ei n c l u d e sv a r i a b l e so na g e ,r a c e ,e d -
ucation, self-reported health status (SRHS), the unemployment rate in the respondent’s county
of residence, labor income and mortality. Because we are interested in income and employ-
ment shocks, we restrict our analysis to working-aged people which we deﬁne to be between 30
(inclusive) and 60 (exclusive) years old. Table 1 reports the summary statistics for all of the
variables in our sample except for the mortality data.1 T h eS R H Sd a t at h a tw ee m p l o ys p a nt h e
years 1984 to 1997. The SRHS data are not available prior to 1984. The data on county level
unemployment rates span the years 1984 to 1993. These data are not publicly available past
1993. The labor income data span the years 1978 to 1997. The reason for going back to 1978
with these data is that it allows us to have more instruments when we employ the Arellano-Bond
estimator later on in the paper. Additional detail concerning this procedure is provided in
Section 3. In addition, the PSID contains a sample of economically disadvantaged people called
the Survey of Economic Opportunities (SEO). We include the SEO in our analysis.2 Finally,
we further restrict our analysis to heads of household and their spouses (provided that they are
married) as the SRHS data are only available for these people.
Our primary measure of health is SRHS which is a categorical variable that takes on integer
1Note that because we include the Survey of Economic Opportunities in our sample, which we discuss in more
detail later, these summary statistics may not be representative of the US population.
2T h e r ei sl i t t l ec o n s e n s u sw i t h i nt h ep r o f e s s i o na b o u thow one should deal with the SEO. Because it is selected
on income and, thus, endogenous, conventional weighting schemes will not work. Accordingly, some people such
as Lillard and Willis (1977) simply recommend dropping the SEO due to endogenous selection. Nevertheless,
there are others such as Hyslop (1999) and Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) who include the SEO. The latter justify
its inclusion on the claim that purging the model of the heterogeneity addresses the endogenous selection into
the SEO. We follow these authors and include the SEO as well. Our reasons for doing so are twofold. First,
like Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), we also purge ﬁxed-eﬀects from most of our estimations. Second, we primarily
employ semi-parametric techniques which require a lot of data.
5values between one and ﬁve and measures the respondent’s assessment of their own health. A
one represents the highest category and a ﬁve represents the lowest category. These measures,
while subjective, do correlate extremely well with more objective measures of health. Numerous
studies have shown that SRHS is informative of speciﬁc morbidities and subsequent mortality
(Mossey and Shapiro 1982; Kaplan and Camacho 1983; Idler and Kasl 1995). In addition,
Smith (2004) has used retrospective health measures from the PSID and shown that there is a
tendency for people to downgrade their self-assessment of their own health when a new condition
manifests.3 Throughout this analysis, we map the SRHS measure into two dummy variables:
good health, which is turned on when SRHS is either a one or a two, and bad health, which is
turned on when SRHS is either a four or a ﬁve. The omitted category is SRHS equal to three.
We also employ mortality data from the PSID’s death ﬁle which is considered sensitive and,
thus, not publicly available. The death ﬁle contains mortality information on all individuals in
the PSID from 1968 to 2003 who were known to have died prior to 2004.4 However, because it
is essential for our purposes to control for the individual’s morbidity and because SRHS is not
available prior to 1984, we only use death dates from 1984 to 2003. Figure 1 plots survivor
functions from the PSID for men and women between the ages of 30 and 60. Both panels of the
ﬁgure contains ten graphs which correspond to a year between 1984 and 1993. Each of these
graphs takes all of the people in the sample of a certain age from a given wave of the survey
and plots the percentage of these people who survived to each subsequent year through 2003.
For example, the bottom graph in each panel corresponds to the base year 1984 and plots the
3We do not believe that the retrospective health measures would not be well-suited for this paper due to
problems associated with recall bias.
4Mortality information ﬁrst comes from interviews with PSID families. PSID then corroborates this informa-
tion with the National Death Index.
6percentage of people who survived until 1985, 1986, 1987, etc.5
Table 2 shows the results from estimation of Cox-Proportional hazard models to illustrate the
relationship between SRHS and mortality in the PSID. We estimate the models using the 1984
wave of the PSID with the number of years that the individual survived subsequent to 1984 as
the dependent variable. Our estimations use a sample of working-aged people. This table shows
that SRHS is a strong predictor of mortality in the PSID and, thus, provides further evidence
that these SRHS variables are very good measures of the respondent’s health.
3 Income Risk and Morbidity
To identify the impact of income shocks on health, we work with the dynamic model:
h
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i,tλ + ai,tδ + υi,t. (1)
hB
i,t is an indicator for bad health (i.e. SRHS is either four or ﬁve).y i,t is a vector which includes
labor income or functions of labor income. ai,t is age. We assume that the residual is mean
zero and serially uncorrelated so that E[υi,t]=E[υi,tυi,s]=0for s 6= t.6 To purge the model of







i,tλ + ∆ai,tδ + ∆υi,t (2)
5 It is important to note that our data show the stylized fact that women have lower mortality, as shown in
Figure 1, and higher morbidity, as shown in Table 1. However, this does not suggest that the SRHS are of poor
quality. Rather, it merely reﬂects that women tend to suﬀer from a diﬀerent distribution of chronic ailments
than men (Case and Paxson, 2005).
6We will provide tests of the plausibility of the lack of serial correlation in υi,t later in the paper.
7Equations (1) and (2) account for two important aspects of the theory of health investment.
First, because equation (2) is purged of the ﬁxed-eﬀect, it allows for all time-invariant individual
characteristics to be correlated with both health and earnings. This is important in light of
the “Fuchs’ Hypothesis” which states that heterogeneity in preferences and discount factors
will generate a correlation between earnings and health even in the absence of any underlying
causal relationships (Fuchs 1982). Accordingly, it is essential that the model is purged of these
unobserved individual characteristics. Second, because we control for an individual’s health
yesterday, we rule out any omitted variable biases that would result from a person’s health
yesterday feeding-back and impacting labor supply today. This is particularly important in
light of Grossman’s original health investment model in which sickness reduces a person’s stock
of “healthy time” which, in turn, constrains their ability to earn. In fact, the estimation
procedure that we employ, which is discussed in the next sub-section, can be generalized to allow
for, not only health yesterday, but also health today, to impact today’s earnings.
3.1 Identiﬁcation and Estimation
Identiﬁcation of the parameters in equations (1) and (2) comes from two sets of moment condi-











where E∗[y|x] denotes the linear-projection of y onto x. We call this Assumption P because these
moment conditions suppose that income and labor supply are predetermined variables. This
8condition assumes that health shocks today are uncorrelated with the history of health outcomes
through yesterday and labor market outcomes through today. However, it allows for feedback
in the sense that health today can impact labor market outcomes tomorrow. The weaker set of






i ]=0 . (E)
We call this Assumption E because, in contrast to Assumption P, it allows for a contemporaneous
relationship between health and labor supply and, thus, treats income as an endogenous variable.
Assumption E has the advantage that it imposes weaker assumptions on the data, but comes at
the expense of reduced eﬃciency.7
At this point, a few words need to be mentioned about the “justiﬁcation” bias in which
people justify being jobless by claiming that they are in worse health than they actually are
(Baker, Stabile and Deri 2004). This bias would generate a systematic correlation between the
residual in our equation and our income measurement. We expect Assumption E to mitigate
(bot not necessarily eliminate) problems with this bias since it does not use income from the
contemporaneous period as an instrument.
To estimate the model, we use the GMM estimator outlined in Arellano and Bond (1991).
The Arellano and Bond (AB) estimator applies Assumptions P and E to the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced







7For an excellent discussion of using these types of moment restrictions to identify dynamic linear panel data













i as instruments for ∆yi,t and ∆hi,t−1. Analogously, equation (4), which is




i as instruments for ∆yi,t and ∆hi,t−1.W e f o l l o w t h e
recommendations of AB and report the parameter estimates from the one-step procedure. As we
discussed in the data section, the SRHS data are not available prior to 1984 and, consequently,
we can only use health as an instrument through that year. However, because data on labor
i n c o m ea r ea v a i l a b l ef o rt h ee n t i r ed u r a t i o no ft h eP S I D ,w ee m p l o yd a t ao ni n c o m et h r o u g h
1978. We did not use data prior to 1978 because we did not expect income from 1977 or earlier
to have much explanatory power for the ﬁrst-diﬀerence in health for 1985 or later.8
3.2 Speciﬁcation Tests
One of the primary advantages of the AB procedure is that the model’s assumptions yield many
moment restrictions which can be used to construct speciﬁcation tests which shed light on the
plausibility of the identifying assumptions of the model. AB propose two speciﬁcation tests.
The ﬁr s tt e s tc e n t e r so nt h ef a c tt h a tw h e nυi,t exhibits no serial correlation, we will have that
E[∆υi,t∆υi,t−1] 6=0and E[∆υi,t∆υi,t−2]=0 . This speciﬁcation test calculates the sample
8We investigated the possibility that these instruments are weak. Recent research has shown that when
instrumental variables do not have suﬃcient explanatory power in the ﬁrst-stage regressions, the ﬁnite sample
distribution of the estimator can diﬀer substantially from its asymptotic distribution (see Staiger and Stock (1994)
and Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995), for example). To look into this issue, we regressed ∆hi,t and each element
of ∆yi,t on the vector, (hi,t−2,...,hi,t−4,y0
i,t−2,...,y0
i,t−4).T h e F-tests of joint signiﬁcance of the regressors all
had extremely low p-values and, thus, there was no indication that weak instruments was a problem. The results
are not reported, but are available upon request.
10analogues of E[∆υi,t∆υi,t−1] and E[∆υi,t∆υi,t−2] to construct statistics that converge to a stan-
dard normal distribution. We follow the notation in AB and let m1 denote the statistic that
is based on E[∆υi,t∆υi,t−1] and let m2 denote the statistic that is based on E[∆υi,t∆υi,t−2].9
Calculation of m1 is very important because if υi,t follows a random walk then we will have that
E[∆υi,t∆υi,t−1]=E[∆υi,t∆υi,t−2]=0 . Consequently, it is possible for m2 to be small even if
υi,t exhibits a large degree of persistence. So, if the model is correctly speciﬁed and there is no
serial correlation in υi,t then m1 should be big and m2 should be small. Further detail on the
calculation of m1 and m2 can be found in AB (pp. 281 - 282).
The second speciﬁcation test that we work with is the Sargan test of over-identifying restric-
tions (Sargan 1958; Hansen 1982). We use the two-step Sargan Statistic which is robust to
heteroskedasticity.10 We chose the two-step statistic over the one-step statistic because Monte
Carlo experiments in AB suggest that there is a tendency for the non-robust test to over-reject
and, thus, AB recommend placing more weight on the two-step statistic. The statistic is asymp-
totically chi-squared with degrees of freedom equal to the number of over-identifying restrictions
in the model.
3.3 Results
We estimated these models using twenty years of data which spanned the years 1978 to 1997.
The income data spanned 1978 to 1997. The SRHS data spanned 1984 to 1997.11
9In fact, AB can accommodate serial correlation in υi,t of the form MA(q) via weaker moment conditions.
However, as it turns out, our calculations of m2 suggests that such accommodation is not necessary.
10Unlike the Sargan Statistics, the speciﬁcation test that uses m1 and m2 is deﬁned in terms of any consistent
estimator. In other words, the statistics m1 and m2 do not necessarily require the eﬃcient two-step estimator.
11We did not employ data beyond 1997 because PSID started to survey households every other year after 1997.
This would have created substantial complications when working with the AB estimator.
11Tables 3 and 4 report the AB estimates for working-aged men and women, respectively. The
top panel uses Assumption P and the bottom panel uses Assumption E. The ﬁrst two columns
use bad health as the dependent variable. The last two columns use the ﬁve point categorical
SRHS variable as the dependent variable. We concede that the linear model that we estimate
does not allow for the ordinal nature of the ﬁve-point SRHS variable. However, it does have
the advantage that it has more variation in the time-series than bad health which only changes
when people move in or out of the bottom two SRHS categories. This longitudinal variation is
extremely useful with ﬁxed-eﬀects estimation.
Table 3 provides evidence of a causal eﬀect of income shocks on health outcomes for working-
aged men. In the top panel, we see that the coeﬃcient on labor income is negative and highly
signiﬁcant in columns 1 and 3. This indicates that positive income shocks tend to improve
health outcomes, at least, on average. In columns 2 and 4 of the top panel, we see that the
indicator for having zero labor income is positive and signiﬁcant which suggests that movements
into unemployment are bad for one’s health. In the bottom panel, where we allow for endogenous
regressors, we see that all of the income variables are still highly signiﬁcant. However, what is
interesting is that the magnitudes of the coeﬃcients rise once we allow for a contemporaneous
relationship between income and health. This may be a consequence of classical measurement
error attenuating the estimates in the top panel. Also, it should be mentioned that this is not
what we would expect to happen if the justiﬁcation bias was an important factor in generating
these results.
The speciﬁcation tests in the bottom of both panels suggest that our moment restrictions hold
up reasonably well in the data when the dependent variable is the binary indicator for having fair
12or poor health. Looking at the calculations of m2 in the ﬁrst two columns of the top and bottom
panels, we see that we cannot reject the null that E[∆υi,t∆υi,t−2]=0at the 5% level in all four
speciﬁcations. However, when we use the 5-point SRHS variable, the speciﬁcation tests which
are based on m2 perform considerably worse. Next, in all eight speciﬁcations in the table, the
p-values on m1 are all extremely low and, thus, always reject the null that E[∆υi,t∆υi,t−1]=0
which rules out a unit root in the process for υi,t. The two-step Sargan Statistic, which AB
recommend, is not signiﬁcant at the 1% level in columns 1 and 2 of the top panel and column
1 of the bottom panel and it is not signiﬁcant at the 5% level in column 3 of the bottom panel.
The Sargan statistic only has an extremely low p-value in the third and fourth columns of both
panels. However, this is not shocking since the linear model is probably not the best way to
deal with the ﬁve-point SRHS variable. Finally, it is important to mention that later on in this
section we estimate some other models in which the speciﬁcation tests perform better than in
this table.
Table 4, which reports the results for working-aged women, is somewhat of a contrast to
t h ep r e v i o u st a b l e . M o s to ft h es p e c i ﬁcations suggest that there is no relationship running
from income to health. However, in columns 3 and 4 of the top panel and in column 3 of
the bottom panel, there is some evidence that adverse income shocks are associated with worse
health, although these coeﬃcients are only marginally signiﬁcant. The speciﬁcation tests in the
table perform pretty well when the dependent variable is the binary indicator for bad health.
Overall, the table only provides weak evidence that adverse income shocks negatively impact the
health outcomes of working-aged women.
We now investigate how transitions into and out of diﬀerent parts of the income distribution
13aﬀect health outcomes. To do this, we construct three dummies for belonging to particular
quartiles of the income distribution. The ﬁr s te q u a l so n ew h e nt h er e s p o n d e n th a sap o s i t i v e
income, but falls below the 25th percentile. The second equals one when the respondent earns
between the 25th and 50th percentiles. The third equals one when the respondent earns between
the 50th and 75th percentiles. In addition, we use the dummy indicating that the respondent
earned no income during the survey year. The omitted category is having an income above the
75th percentile. We estimate a variant of equation (2) which includes these four dummy variables.
We employ Assumption E and, thus, treat each of these dummy variables as endogenous. The
quartiles that were used to construct the dummies were calculated separately for men and women.
Finally, because the 25th percentile of income for working-aged women was zero, we did not
include it when estimating the models for women.
The results are reported in Table 5. What we now see is a far more complicated picture
than what we saw in the previous two tables. In the ﬁrst three columns, we observe that
the zero income dummy is always positive, whereas the other dummies are always negative.
This indicates that transitions from positive earnings to zero earnings are associated with a
deterioration in health. This is consistent with the previous results in this section. However,
a careful look at the table suggests that, among people with positive earnings, transitions to
higher quantiles are actually associated with worse health outcomes. Indeed, the fact that the
dummies for the 25th, 50th and 75th percentile dummies all have negative coeﬃcient estimates
suggests that transitions from having a positive income that falls below the 75th percentile to
having an income that falls above the 75th percentile is actually bad for a person’s health. It is
also important to emphasize that the speciﬁcation tests in this table perform exceptionally well
14when the binary indicator for bad health is the dependent variable. Finally, in contrast to Table
4, this table provides stronger evidence that income shocks impact women’s health.
We conclude this section with a few cautionary notes on the proper interpretation of these
results. First, the results in Table 5 show us how movements in and out of various parts
of the income distribution aﬀect health. However, the coeﬃcients on the quartile dummies
are not informative of the level of health in that quartile. For example, the fact that the 75th
percentile dummy is negative indicates that moving from the 75th percentile to the top percentile
is associated with a deterioration in health. It does not indicate that people with income in the
highest quartile of the distribution have worse health than those in the second highest quartile.
Second, there is no contradiction between the results in Table 5 and the results in Tables 3
and 4. Tables 3 and 4 indicate that an adverse income shock has a negative impact on health
outcomes on average. Table 5 indicates that these average eﬀects in the previous tables mask
some more subtle eﬀects. In particular, Table 5 suggests that most of the adverse impact of
a negative income shock on health is dominated by transitions into unemployment, as opposed
to transitions to lower, but positive incomes. Finally, Table 5 does provide some evidence that
negative income shocks can be good for your health, although Tables 3 and 4 suggest that, on
average, they are not.
4 Income Risk and Mortality
In this section, we investigate the relationship between income risk and mortality in the PSID.
Unfortunately, however, while a person’s health status may change at numerous points dur-
15ing their life, a person’s mortality only changes once. Accordingly, we can no longer rely on
time-series variation and appropriate moment restrictions for identiﬁcation. However, we can
document some interesting correlations which may, at least to some extent, reﬂect an under-lying
causal relationship.













for j =1 ,2,3. (5)
The dependent variables, d1
i,t,d 2
i,t and d3
i,t, are dummy variables which indicate that the person has
died within a one, three or ﬁve year window of the survey year. We employ diﬀerent windows
to account for the possibility that it might take varying lengths of time for the consequences
of income shocks to manifest. ui,t is the unemployment rate in the individual’s county of
residence. We focus on these unemployment rates rather than income as we ﬁnd the former to
be more plausibly exogenous than the latter.12 To illustrate that movements in unemployment
rates translate into income shocks, we report the results of ﬁxed-eﬀects regressions of income
measures on the unemployment rate in Table 6. Not surprisingly, we see that increases in the
unemployment rate have negative and signiﬁcant impacts on income. xi,t contains additional
controls including controls for good (SRHS equal to one or two) and bad (SRHS equal to four
or ﬁve) health. This is important as it mitigates (but does not eliminate) selection concerns
that areas with high unemployment might be inhabited by unhealthy people due to the fact that
healthier people are more likely to migrate out of depressed areas.13 α
j
i is an individual-speciﬁc
12We concede that there are also reasons to believe that macroeconomic conditions would be endogenous as
well. One reason would be that people often migrate in response to the business cycle. Despite these concerns,
we ﬁnd the potential endogoneity issues with labor income to be far greater than with the unemployment rates.
13For a discussion of this, see Halliday (2006).
16eﬀect. ε
j
i,t is a individual-period speciﬁce ﬀect. We estimate the model with a random eﬀects
probit estimator.
T h er e s u l t sa r er e p o r t e di nT a b l e7a n da r eb r o a d l yi nl i n ew i t ht h er e s to ft h er e s u l t st h a tw e
have presented. In the top panel, we report the results for working-aged men. We see that high
unemployment is positively associated with dying within one year of the survey year. However,
there is no relationship between unemployment rates and dying within three or ﬁve years of the
survey. In the bottom panel, we report the results for working-aged women and the story is very
diﬀerent. In the ﬁrst and last columns, there is no relationship between unemployment rates
and mortality. However, in the second column, we see that there is a negative and signiﬁcant
relationship between unemployment and mortality for women.
This ﬁnding is interesting and, in conjunction with some of the evidence in Table 5, may be
indicative that adverse income shocks are actually good for women’s health on average. However,
we admonish the reader not to infer too much from this ﬁnding for three reasons. First, the
evidence in Table 4 does not support this proposition. Second, the evidence on the relationship
between income shocks and health is far more consistent for men than it is for women. Third,
because mortality is far less common for women, the standard errors in the bottom panel of
T a b l e7a r em u c hl a r g e rt h a ni nt h et o pp a n e l . I n d e e d ,t h es t a n d a r de r r o ro nt h eu n e m p l o y m e n t
estimate in column 2 is 0.029 for women and is 0.017 for men.
5C o n c l u s i o n s a n d C a v e a t s
Employing twenty of data from the PSID and the Arellano-Bond estimator, we provided evidence
that, on average, adverse income shocks lead to a deterioration in health. This relationship was
17strongest for working-aged men. These eﬀects appeared to be dominated by transitions into
unemployment. In addition, we provided evidence that movements from the bottom and top
tails of the income distribution towards the middle of the distribution lead to improvements in
health. Finally, we provided some suggestive evidence that negative income shocks might lead
to higher mortality for working-aged men.
It is important to place these ﬁndings within the context of some of the literature which has
investigated causal pathways between SES and health. One of the most important papers on
this topic is Adams, Hurd, at al. (2003) who investigate causality between wealth and health in
a population of older Americans. They ﬁnd no evidence of a causal link from SES to mortality
and many morbidities, but they do reject the hypothesis of non-causality for some primary causes
of death of older men such as cancer and heart disease.14 In a related piece, Meer, Miller and
Rosen (2003) use inheritance as an instrument for changes in wealth and ﬁnd no evidence that
health improves with exogenous increases in wealth. While it may be tempting to say that our
research is at loggerheads with this earlier work, we do not believe that this is the case. It is true
t h a tw ed op r o v i d es o m ee v i d e n c et h a ti n c o m es h o c k sm a yh a v es i z a b l ei m p a c t so nt h eh e a l t ho f
working-aged men at the bottom of the income distribution. However, this is, by no means, in
contradiction with the assertion that exogenous changes in wealth (not income) do not inﬂuence
health in a population of older people.
Some caveats on the limitations of this work deserve to be mentioned. First, it is not clear to
what extent our estimates of the impact of labor income on self-reported health status translate
into an impact on mortality. Given the results of Section 4, we believe that there may be
14For an interesting comment on this paper, see Adda, Chandola and Marmot (2003).
18some eﬀect on mortality, but the magnitude of this eﬀect is hard to infer from this analysis.
Second, due to the constraints of the PSID, the health measures that we employ are somewhat
limited. However, one of the primary advantages of these measures is that they exhibit signiﬁcant
variation across time which enables the use of panel data methods such as the AB estimator.
Without substantial time variation, as would be the case with measures of speciﬁcc o n d i t i o n s
such as diabetes and heart disease, these methods cannot be used.
Finally, while this work provides evidence that adverse income shocks lead to worse health
outcomes, it is uninformative of the mechanisms by which this occurs. One possible mechanism
that we discussed earlier is that negative income shocks are accompanied by increases in stress
which, in turn, causes health to deteriorate. However, another potential mechanism is that
negative shocks lead to a lower consumption of inputs in the production of health such as medical
care. Indeed, the fact that the most dominant eﬀects of income shocks on health that we
uncovered occurred when people moved into unemployment and the fact that employer sponsored
health insurance is the most common form of health coverage in the US suggests that this
mechanism is worthy of serious consideration.
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∗All summary statistics correspond to the years 1984 - 1993 unless noted otherwise.
∗∗Summary statistics are for people older than 30.
1These summary statistics correspond to 1984 - 1997.
2These summary statistics correspond to 1978 - 1997.
3Labor Income is in 1982 dollars.



















∗This table contains results from the Cox-Proportional Hazard model.
∗∗Each cell reports the hazard ratio for an incremental change in a given variable.
∗∗∗t-ratios correspond to the unreported coeﬃcients for each variable.
∗∗∗∗All estimations used a sample of people between 30 and 60.
25Table 3: Arellano-Bond Estimates - Men Between Ages 30 and 60
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Predetermined Variables



















































































































O.I. Restrictions 226 226 226 226
N 6507 6507 6507 6507
∗t-statistics reported below each coeﬃcient estimate.
1Zero Labor Income? is an indicator which is turned on if labor income is zero.
2p-values in parentheses.
3The dependent variable is this column is an indicator that equals one when the
person’s health is either fair or poor.
4The dependent variable in this column is the 5-point SRHS variable.
26Table 4: Arellano-Bond Estimates - Women Between Ages 30 and 60
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Predetermined Variables



















































































































O.I. Restrictions 226 226 226 226
N 7265 7265 7265 7265
∗t-statistics reported below each coeﬃcient estimate.
1Zero Labor Income? is an indicator which is turned on if labor income is zero.
2p-values in parentheses.
3The dependent variable is this column is an indicator that equals one when the
person’s health is either fair or poor.
4The dependent variable in this column is the 5-point SRHS variable.
27Table 5: Arellano-Bond Estimates - Income by Quartile, People Between 30 and 60
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Men Women














































































O.I. Restrictions 673 673 524 524
N 6507 6507 7265 7265
∗This table assumes that all income and labor supply variables are endogenous.
∗∗t-statistics reported below each coeﬃcient estimate.
1Zero Labor Income? is an indicator which is turned on if labor income is zero.
2p-values in parentheses.
3The dependent variable is this column is an indicator that equals one when the
person’s health is either fair or poor.
4The dependent variable in this column is the 5-point SRHS variable.
28Table 6: Macroeconomic Shocks and Labor Market Outcomes
Labor Income Zero Labor Income?1












∗This table reports the coeﬃcient on unemployment from
ﬁxed-eﬀects regressions where the dependent variables
are labor income and labor supply. All regressions contain a
polynomial in age. The regressions where estimated using
people between the ages of 30 and 60.
∗∗t-statistics in parentheses.
∗∗∗Each cell reports the eﬀects of a 1 percentage point increase
in unemployment on labor income and labor force participation.
1Zero Labor Income? is an indicator which is turned on if labor income is zero.
29Table 7: Random Eﬀects Estimates - Mortality
(1) (2) (3)
Men Between 30 and 60











































Likelihood -1296.04 -1459.66 -1690.95
N 6315 6315 6315
Women Between 30 and 60











































Likelihood -735.27 -1026.04 -1228.14
N 6923 6923 6923
∗This table contains results from random eﬀects probits where
the dependent variables are indicators for dying between the
survey year and one, three and ﬁve years after.
∗∗t-ratios correspond to the unreported coeﬃcients for each variable.
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1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Survivor Functions - Women Between 30 and 60
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